The Doctrine of Manifest Disregard of the Law after Hall Street: Implications for Judicial Review of International Arbitrations in U.S. Courts by Chen, Annie
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 32, Issue 6 2008 Article 3
The Doctrine of Manifest Disregard of the
Law after Hall Street: Implications for Judicial
Review of International Arbitrations in U.S.
Courts
Annie Chen∗
∗
Copyright c©2008 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
The Doctrine of Manifest Disregard of the
Law after Hall Street: Implications for Judicial
Review of International Arbitrations in U.S.
Courts
Annie Chen
Abstract
This Note examines the doctrine of manifest disregard, its impact on international arbitration,
and its future after Hall Street. The focus of the discussion is U.S. law. Part I sets out the legal
framework for arbitration in the United States and the statutory and extrastatutory grounds for va-
catur of awards. It discusses the development and application of the doctrine of manifest disregard
of the law in U.S. common law and the tension this has created with the FAA. Part II analyzes
the Hall Street decision and the subsequent developing circuit split, including the case’s impact
on viability of manifest disregard. It also discusses different approaches to reconciling manifest
disregard with the FAA both through the judiciary and legislature. Finally Part III argues that Hall
Street has not eliminated manifest disregard and that the Second and Ninth Circuits’ approach to
reading the doctrine into the FAA is the best method of resolving the tension between the FAA
and the doctrine. By adopting this approach, the Supreme Court would clarify its stance on the
viability of manifest disregard and take a significant step in addressing the underlying tension
between the FAA and the manifest disregard doctrine. This Note further argues that, on policy
grounds-especially with regard to promoting international arbitration in the United States and as
consistent with legislative intent-manifest disregard as a doctrine should only survive as a part of
the FAA.
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INTRODUCTION
International arbitration has grown rapidly as a method of
commercial dispute resolution in the past few decades.' Along
with this overall growth, international arbitrations involving the
United States, as a party or as a forum, have grown,2 making U.S.
law on arbitration enforcement relevant to international parties.
International arbitration is governed by the New York
Convention,3 an international treaty that fosters the recognition
* J.D., 2009, Fordham University School of Law. The author thanks Ernie Gao,
Ekaterina Napalkova, and Professor Arthur Rovine for their insightful comments and
guidance.
1. See, e.g., TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 59 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005)
(estimating that ninety percent of international contracts include arbitration clauses);
see also Gilles Cuniberti, Beyond Contract-The Case for Default Arbitration in International
Commercial Disputes, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 417, 417 (2009) (stating that there is
anecdotal evidence of the rapid growth of international arbitration in the last forty
years).
2. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, New Experiences of International Arbitration in the
United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 233 (2006) (stating that, from 1993 to 2003, the
international arbitration caseload of the American Arbitration Association more than
tripled, and that, in 2002, it announced that it had become the largest international
commercial arbitral institution in the world); see also Kate Kennedy, Note, Manifest
Disregard in Arbitration Awards: A Manifestation of Appeals Versus a Disregard for Just
Resolutions, 16J.L. & POL'y 417, 424 (2007) (stating that the United States' involvement
in international arbitration has grown since the early 1990s).
3. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; see also THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU,
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 342 (2004) (describing the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention")).
The convention requires courts of contracting states to give effect to private agreements
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and enforcement of nondomestic arbitral awards. 4 Arbitration in
the United States is governed generally by the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 5 which also incorporates the New York
Convention. 6
In U.S. domestic arbitrations under the FAA, once an
arbitrator or arbitral tribunal renders an award, a party can
petition forjudicial intervention on very limited grounds: a party
can file an action to modify or correct the award in order to
rectify clerical mistakes, or the parties can also lodge an action to
confirm or vacate the award. 7 In addition to these enumerated
FAA grounds, there are several implied or extrastatutory grounds
for vacatur: an award can be vacated of it is in "manifest
disregard of the law," "arbitrary and capricious," "completely
irrational," or violates "public policy" that can be raised in
arbitrations governed by the FAA.8 Of these, perhaps the most
used is the doctrine of manifest disregard of the law ("manifest
disregard" or "the "doctrine").9
to arbitrate and to recognize and enforce arbitration awards made in other contracting
states. It applies to arbitrations that are not considered as domestic awards in the state
in which recognition and enforcement is sought. Id. at 342.
4. See infra Part L.A (detailing the legal framework of international commercial
arbitration).
5. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-208, 301-307 (2006); see also
infra Part L.A (detailing the framework of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")).
6. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006) (incorporating the NewYork Convention).
7. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (authorizing parties to confirm or vacate an award); 9
U.S.C. § 11 (2006) (authorizing parties to correct an award based on clerical mistakes);
see also CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 297 (explaining the process after an award is
rendered). For the language of § 10, see infra note 29 and accompanying text. For the
language of § 11, see infra note 30 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 297 (listing the extrastatutory grounds for
vacatur under the FAA); Stephen L. Hayford & Scott B. Kerrigan, Vacatur The Non-
Statutory Grounds for Judicial Review of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 51 DISPUTE RES. J.
22, 23 (1996) (same).
9. See, e.g., Andrew P. Tuck, The Finality Question: Appellate Rights and Review of
Arbitral Awards in the Americas, 14 LAw & BUS. REV. AM. 569, 577 (2008) (stating that
manifest disregard is perhaps the most widely recognized and frequently argued ground
for vacatur); see also Michael P. O'Mullan, Note, Seeking Consistency in Judicial Review of
Securities Arbitration: An Analysis of the Manifest Disregard of the law Standard, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1121, 1124 (1995) (stating that chief among the judicially created grounds for
vacatur is manifest disregard of the law).
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The FAA states that for a nondomestic'O award under the
New York Convention, a court "shall confirm the award unless it
finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or
enforcement of the award specified by the New York
Convention."'" Although the U.S. federal courts of appeals
("circuit courts") are divided on whether the FAA or the New
York Convention grounds apply in an action to vacate a
nondomestic award made in the United States, 12 the manifest
disregard standard has never been applied to international
arbitrations arbitrated in a foreign state. Circuit courts have
ruled, however, that all grounds for vacatur available for
domestic arbitrations can be applied to international parties.' 3
This means that the extrastatutory, common-law grounds for
vacatur in the United States-namely manifest disregard-can be
applied to international arbitrations arbitrated in the United
States. International parties thus need to understand U.S. law on
arbitration enforcement and consider the availability of manifest
disregard when balancing the pros and cons of the United States
as a forum for arbitration. 14
10. Under Article I(1) of the New York Convention, "foreign" awards are awards
made outside of where enforcement of the award is sought, whereas "non-domestic"
awards are awards "not considered as domestic awards." GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 726 (2d.ed 2001). Foreign
awards can only use the New York Convention for vacatur, whereas there is debate about
whether a nondomestic award can be vacated under domestic law. Id.
11. 9 U.S.C § 207 (2006).
12. See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 2, at 241-42 (citing circuit split); see also BORN,
supra note 10, at 726 (2d.ed 2001) (same).
13. See, e.g., Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2nd Cir. 1997)
("The Convention specifically contemplates that the state in which or under the law of
which, the award is made, will be free to set aside or modify an award in accordance with
its domestic arbitral law and its full panoply of express and implied grounds for relief.");
see alsoJacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 709, 712 (6th
Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396
(2008) ("Because this award was made in the United States, we can apply domestic law,
found in the FAA, to vacate the award. ... The arbitration award is to be reviewed
according to the federal standard for vacatur."); William Park et al., International
Commercial Dispute Resolution, 37 INT'L L. 445, 445 (2003) (stating that the FAA has been
interpreted to permit vacatur in an international arbitration on the same grounds
available in domestic cases).
14. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 2, at 425 (stating that parties should consider
whether they want to expose themselves to manifest disregard before arbitrating in the
United States); see also Lawrence W. Newman & David Zaslowksy, 'Manifest Disregard' in
International Arbitration, N.Y.L.J., July 31, 2006, at 3 (suggesting that because U.S. courts
use manifest disregard and therefore evaluate arbitral awards on their merits,
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A 2008 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Hall Street Associates v.
Mattel, Inc., has called the existence of manifest disregard into
question and has already had an impact on the viability of the
doctrine outside of the FAA. 15 Hall Street held that the FAA did
not permit parties contractually to expand the grounds for
vacating or modifying an arbitral award.' 6 As a result of this
holding, the Court adopted a reading of the FAA that raised
questions on other issues, including the viability of the manifest
disregard as a ground for vacatur of arbitral awards. Hall Street
left open the issue of whether manifest disregard of the law
remains as an independent basis for vacatur of arbitral awards
despite the fact that that it is not one of the enumerated grounds
of the FAA. 17 Since Hall Street, U.S. circuit courts have disagreed
on the status of manifest disregard, leaving the doctrine highly
unsettled.18 The Supreme Court recently denied the petition for
a writ of certiorari of one of the leading cases, and granted the
petition for a writ of certiorari in second leading case on another
issue.19
international parties to arbitration will be hesitant to enter into arbitrations in the
United States).
15. See 128 S. Ct. at 1404-06; see also infra Part II.A (detailing the Hall Street opinion)
and Part II.B (detailing how circuit courts have interpreted Hall Street).
16. 128 S. Ct. at 1400 ("The question here is whether statutory grounds for prompt
vacatur and modification may be supplemented by contract. We hold that the statutory
grounds are exclusive."); see also infra Part II.A (detailing the Hall Street opinion).
17. SeeJohn Fellas & Hagit Elul, Supreme Court Says "No" to Contractual Expansion of
FAA Judicial Review, 63 DISPUTE RES. J. 5, 12 (2008) (stating that Hall Street will likely
have an impact on the viability of manifest disregard as a separate ground of judicial
review); see also Arthur D. Felsenfeld & Antonette Ruocco, 'Manifest Disregard'After 'Hall
Street': The Early Returns, N.Y.L.J, Sept. 19, 2009, at 24 (questioning the status of manifest
disregard after Hall Street); infra Part II.A for a detailed analysis of Hall Street
18. See infra Part II.B (detailing how circuit courts have interpreted Hall Street as
affecting the viability of manifest disregard).
19. The Supreme Court recently granted the petition for a writ of certiorari in the
leading Second Circuit case but not on the issue of whether or not manifest disregard
survives Hall Street. See Stolt-Neilsen SA v. Animal Feeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir.
2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2793 (2009); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Stolt-
Neilsen, No. 08-1198, 2009 WL 797583 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Stolt-Neilsen]. The Supreme Court recently denied the petition for a writ of
certiorari that challenged a Sixth Circuit decision that vacated an arbitration award on
the ground of manifest disregard of the law. See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 300 F.
App'x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 2009 WL 1342336; see also Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Coffee Beanery, No. 08-1396, (U.S. May 11, 2009) [hereinafter Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Coffee Beanery]; infra Part II.B. 1.
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This Note examines the doctrine of manifest disregard, its
impact on international arbitration, and its future after Hall
Street. The focus of the discussion is U.S. law. Part I sets out the
legal framework for arbitration in the United States and the
statutory and extrastatutory grounds for vacatur of awards. It
discusses the development and application of the doctrine of
manifest disregard of the law in U.S. common law and the
tension this has created with the FAA. Part II analyzes the Hall
Street decision and the subsequent developing circuit split,
including the case's impact on viability of manifest disregard. It
also discusses different approaches to reconciling manifest
disregard with the FAA both through the judiciary and
legislature. Finally Part III argues that Hall Street has not
eliminated manifest disregard and that the Second and Ninth
Circuits' approach to reading the doctrine into the FAA is the
best method of resolving the tension between the FAA and the
doctrine. By adopting this approach, the Supreme Court would
clarify its stance on the viability of manifest disregard and take a
significant step in addressing the underlying tension between the
FAA and the manifest disregard doctrine. This Note further
argues that, on policy grounds-especially with regard to
promoting international arbitration in the United States and as
consistent with legislative intent-manifest disregard as a
doctrine should only survive as a part of the FAA.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LA W
The common law doctrine of manifest disregard is an
extrastatutory ground for vacatur of arbitral awards that exists
outside of the FAA-therefore its existence creates tensions
within the basic legal framework for arbitration in the United
States. This Part sets forth the legal background for the doctrine
of manifest disregard. It first outlines the statutory framework
centered on the FAA and the FAA's grounds for vacatur. It then
discusses the origin and development of manifest disregard of
the law and how it is applied in U.S. courts. The discussion here
is limited to chapter 1 of the FAA, which deals with domestic
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arbitrations, and how the FAA and extrastatutory grounds for
vacatur may affect international arbitration. 20
A. The FAA: The Statutory Framework for Vacatur in the United States
The central statutory framework for arbitration in the
United States is the FAA-enacted in 1925 and amended in 1970
to incorporate the New York Convention into U.S. law.2 ' Chapter
1 lays out the provisions of the Act that make arbitration
agreements and awards enforceable; it applies to domestic
arbitrations and international arbitrations for which the seat of
arbitration is in the United States. 22 Chapter 2 implements the
New York Convention, and governs international arbitral awards
for which the arbitration took place in a foreign state. 23 Chapter
3 implements the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as the
Panama Convention. 24
The FAA encourages confirmation of arbitral awards. The
presumption is that awards will be enforced for certain
exceptions. Pursuant to section 9 of the FAA, a court must
confirm an arbitral award unless it is "vacated, modified, or
corrected as prescribed" in sections 10 and 11.25 The grounds
for vacating an arbitral award are set out in section 10 of the FAA,
and the grounds for modifying an award are set out in section 11
of the FAA.26
In addition to the FAA's policy in favor of confirmation of
awards, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the United States
20. See supra note 12-14 and accompanying text (describing how U.S. courts have
applied its domestic law of vacatur to international parties).
21. See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 2, at 235 (discussing the FAA); see also
CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 80 (stating when the FAA was enacted and when Chapter
2, the New York Convention, was incorporated).
22. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006) (entitled "Arbitration,"
defining the FAA's scope of application); see also CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 80
(describing Chapter I of the FAA).
23. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006) (entitled "Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards," incorporating the New York Convention); see
also CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 80 (describing Chapter 2 of the FAA).
24. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (2006) (entitled "The Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration"); see also CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 80
(describing Chapter 3 of the FAA).
25. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006).
26. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2006).
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has an "emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute
resolution," 27 and "a strong belief in the efficacy of arbitral
procedures for the resolution of international commercial
disputes ... "28 Because of the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration, judicial review of arbitration, and specifically judicial
vacatur of an arbitral award, is very limited.29
The grounds for vacatur under section 10(a) of the FAA
only include situations in which the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means, and where the arbitrators are
guilty of misconduct or exceeded their powers. Section 10(a) of
the FAA states that vacatur will only be ordered:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.30
Section 11 of the FAA identifies additional grounds for
modifying or correcting an award, which include evident
material miscalculation, evident material mistake, and
imperfections in a matter of form not affecting the merits. It
provides that the award may be modified or corrected:
(a) [w]here there was an evident material miscalculation of
figures or an evident material mistake in the description of
any person, thing, or property referred to in the award[;]
27. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631
(1985).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 297 (stating that the pro-enforcement
presumption is so strong that it can only be defeated in exceptional circumstances of
"extreme adjudicatory unfairness or profound arbitrator incompetence"); see also
Hayford & Kerrigan, supra note 8, at 22 (stating that the FAA articulates narrow grounds
for vacatur).
30. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
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(b) [w] here the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not
submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the
merits of the decision upon the matter submitted[; or]
(c) [w]here the award is imperfect in matter of form not
affecting the merits of the controversy.3 1
While under the FAA, sections 10 and 11 provide the only
enumerated bases for vacatur of an arbitral award, these statutory
grounds for vacatur are not the only grounds for vacatur under
U.S. law.
B. Manifest Disregard of the Law: An Extrastatutory Ground for
Vacatur
In addition to statutory grounds for vacatur contained in
FAA section 10, there are also several extrastatutory, judicially-
created, grounds for vacatur.3 2 Of these, perhaps the most used
is manifest disregard of the law. 33 The doctrine of manifest
disregard of law traces its origins to 1953, when the U.S. Supreme
Court stated in Wilko v. Swan that "the interpretations of the law
by . .. arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not
subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in
interpretation. '" 3 4 The entire doctrine of manifest disregard of
the law has developed out of this dictum from Wilko, a case that
has been since overruled on its principal ruling.3 5
Prior to Hall Street, manifest disregard as an independent
ground for vacatur was well accepted by all the circuit courts
except for the Seventh Circuit.36 Courts, however, have not been
31. 9 U.S.C. § 11.
32. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing the implied extrastatutory
grounds for vacatur).
33. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (stating that manifest disregard is
perhaps the mostly widely recognized and frequently argued grounds for vacatur); see
also CARBONNEAU, supra note 3, at 315 (stating that manifest disregard is perhaps the
best known of the common law grounds for vacatur).
34. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/AmExpress, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
35. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 479-84 (overruling Wilko on other grounds).
36. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2006)
("Courts do, however, retain a very limited power to review arbitral awards outside of
section 10. ... [W]e have referred to this non-statutory standard of review as manifest
disregard of the law." (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)); Rich v.
Spartis, 516 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Although 'manifest disregard' is not included
in § 10(a) of the FAA as a ground for vacating an arbitral award ... 'if the arbitrators
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able to form a clear and uniform standard for the doctrine.
Generally, the manifest disregard exception is conservatively
construed and it is not often used by courts as a basis to vacate
awards.37
simply ignore the applicable law, the literal application of a 'manifest disregard'
standard should presumably compel vacation of the award."' (quoting Sobel v. Hertz,
Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972))); Sherrock Bros. v. DaimlerChrysler
Motors Co., 260 F. App'x 497, 499 (3d Cir. 2008) ("A court's ability to vacate an arbitral
award is almost exclusively limited to [FAA] grounds, although an award found to be in
manifest disregard of the law can also be vacated .... (citations omitted)); Choice
Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. SM Property Mgmt., LLC, 519 F.3d 200, 207 (4th Cir. 2008) ("'The
permissible common law grounds for vacating such an award ... include those
circumstances where ... the award evidences a manifest disregard of the law." (quoting
Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2006))); Kergosien v.
Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 353 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Besides the four statutory
grounds, manifest disregard of the law and contrary to public policy are the only non-
statutory bases recognized by this circuit for vacatur .. " (citations omitted)), abrogated
by Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009); Solvay
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 442 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir.
2006) ("In addition [to the FAA], courts have held that judicial intervention is
appropriate where arbitrators act with 'manifest disregard of the law."' (quoting Jacada
(Europe), Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 712 (6th Cir. 2005)));
Hudson v. ConAgra Poultry Co. 484 F.3d 496, 504 (8th Cir. 2007) ("Our court has also
recognized grounds for vacating an arbitral award that are not expressed in the [FAA]
itself .... We have said that a district court 'can vacate an arbitral award if [the award]
evidences a manifest disregard for the law."' (alteration in original) (quoting McGrann
v. First Albany Corp., 424 F.3d 743, 749 (8th Cir. 2005))); Sanford v. Memberworks Inc.,
483 F.3d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e will vacate the award only if the arbitrator
violated the [FAA] ... or exhibits 'manifest disregard of the law.' (quoting Coutee v.
Barington Capital Group, L.P., 336 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003))); Lewis v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 500 F.3d 1140, 1150 (10th Cir. 2007) ("Those 'judicially created
exceptions' apply to awards that ... derive from a manifest disregard of the law ......
(quoting Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. v. Union Pac. R.R., 119 F.3d 847, 849 (10th Cir.
1997))); B.L. Harbert Int'l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 910 (11th Cir.
2006) ("In addition to those four statutory ground for vacatur [in the FAA], we have
said that there are three non-statutory grounds. An award may be vacated if ... the
award was made in manifest disregard for the law." (citing Montes v. Shearson Lehman
Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 1464 (11th Cir. 1997))); Lessin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 481 F.3d 813, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("In addition to the grounds under the
[FAA] on which an arbitral award may be vacated, an award may be vacated only if it is
in 'manifest disregard of the law'...." (quoting LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 246
F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2001))). But see Halim v. Great Gatsby's Auction Gallery, Inc.,
516 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 2008) ("This Court has limited the 'manifest disregard of the
law' standard for purposes of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) .... " (citation omitted)).
37. See Kenneth M. Curtin, Contractual Expansion & Limitation of Judicial Review of
Arbitral Awards, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 56, 60 (2001) (stating that the standard is that an
arbitrator must "appreciate the existence of a clearly governing and understandable
legal principle" and also "decide to ignore it" to be in manifest disregard of the law).
Curtin further states that while courts cite and consider the manifest disregard
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The manifest disregard standard has been articulated and
applied in many different ways by the circuit courts. In the First,
Fourth, Eight, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, it is described as a
"conscious disregard" standard.38 In the Second, Sixth, Ninth,
and District of Columbia Circuits it has been articulated as a
more stringent test applied where the "conscious disregard"
standard has to be met and the law has to be well defined,
explicit, and clearly applicable to the case at hand.39 Aside from
these two main articulations of the doctrine, the Fifth Circuit's
approach has been to vacate under manifest disregard if the
arbitrator acted contrary to applicable law and if enforcing the
award would result in significant injustice after taking into
exception to award enforcement, the exception is "little more than a historical oddity
that is rarely, if ever, successfully asserted." Id.
38. See Hicks v. Bank of America, 218 F. App'x 739, 745 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating
that there must be "willful inattentiveness to the governing law"); Aldred v. AVIS Rent-a-
Car, 247 F. App'x 167, 169 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that the arbitrator was "conscious of
the law and deliberately ignored it"); Cytyc Corp. v. DEKA Prods. Ltd., 439 F.3d 27, 35
(1st Cir. 2006) (stating that it requires "some showing in the record, other than the
result obtained, that the arbitrators knew the law and expressly disregarded it"); Patten,
441 F.3d at 235 ("[M]anifest disregard of the law is established only where the
Iarbitrator[] understands and correctly states the law, but proceeds to disregard the
same."' (second alteration in original) (quoting Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine
Workers, Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1991))); Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
Payne, 374 F.3d 672, 674 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Any disregard must 'be made clearly to
appear' and may be found 'when arbitrators understand and correctly state the law, but
proceed to disregard the same."' (quoting Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc.,
783 F.2d 743, 750 (8th Cir. 1986))).
39. See Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879-80 (9th Cir. 2007) ("'It must
be clear from the record that the arbitrators recognized the applicable law and then
ignored it. . . . [T]he governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrators
must be well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable."' (citation omitted) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Carter v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., 374 F.3d 830, 838 (9th Cir. 2004)));
Bear Stearns & Co. v. 1109580 Ontario, Inc., 409 F.3d 87, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2005) ("To
vacate an arbitral award, a reviewing court must find 'both that (1) the arbitrators knew
of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it all together, and (2)
the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the
case."' (quoting DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 821 (2d Cir.
1997))); LaPrade, 246 F.3d at 706 ("[A] court must find that (1) the arbitrators knew of
a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether and (2) the
law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the
case."); Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000) ("An arbitration panel
acts with manifest disregard if'(1) the applicable legal principle is clearly defined and
not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrators refused to heed that legal
principle.'" (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 420
(6th Cir. 1995))).
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account all circumstances of the case. 40 Finally the Third Circuit
has said that the error must "fly in the face of established legal
precedent." 41  Since the Seventh Circuit never recognized
manifest disregard as an extrastatutory ground for vacatur, its
standard is defined within the FAA.42
Even prior to Hall Street, there was no uniform standard of
the doctrine.43 From the various circuit formulations, it is clear
that the doctrine is very limited and most circuits require at least
a "conscious disregard" of the law on the part of the arbitrator.
The doctrine's standard can be very difficult for a party to
meet. For example, judicial review that determines that the
arbitral panel misapplied the law does not constitute manifest
disregard of the law. 44 To determine if there was a "conscious
disregard," the application of the standard is tied to the existence
of a reasoned award because that is the easiest way a court can
determine whether the arbitrator understood the law and
disregarded it.45 Since it has to be apparent that the arbitral
40. See, e.g., Sarofim v. Trust Co. of the W., 440 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2006)
("First, where on the basis of the information available to the court it is not manifest
that the arbitrators acted contrary to the applicable law, the award should be upheld.
Second, where on the basis of the information available to the court it is manifest that
the arbitrators acted contrary to the applicable law, the award should be upheld unless it
would result in significant injustice, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case ... ").
41. Sherrock Bros., Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC, 260 F. App'x 497, 499
(3d Cir. 2008) (stating that the error must "fly in the face of established legal
precedent").
42. Halim v. Great Gatsby's Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 2008)
("This Court has limited the 'manifest disregard of the law' standard for purposes of 9
U.S.C. § 10(a) (4) to encompass only two scenarios: (1) an order requiring the parties to
violate the law; or (2) an order that does not adhere to the legal principles specified by
the contract.").
43. See Nicholas Weiskopf, Arbitral Injustice-Rethinking the Manifest Disregard
Standard for Judicial Review of Award, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 283, 287 (describing how
courts cannot agree on what a showing of manifest disregard requires); see also Brad A.
Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating
the Use and Utility of the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law Standard, 27 IND. L. REv. 242, 262
(1993) (stating that courts are forced to review many motions that border on being
frivolous because the standard is not clear).
44. See, e.g., Hicks v. Bank of America, 218 F. App'x 739, 741, 746 (10th Cir. 2007)
(stating that there must be "willful inattentiveness to the governing law").
45. See Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the "Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard:
The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DiSP. RESOL. 117, 135-36 (1998)
(describing the difficulty of finding the arbitrator's understanding and application of
the law without a reasoned opinion); see also Weiskopf, supra note 43, at 287-88 (stating
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panel was aware of binding law on the issue, the absence of either
a record or a reasoned opinion can make it impossible to prove
manifest disregard. 46 The application of the standard can also
depend on the existence of clear legal precedent on the issue, or
it is possible that there is no law that the arbitrator can manifestly
disregard. 47
C. The Tension Between Manifest Disregard and the FAA: Weighing
Judicial Review Against Deference to Arbitration
The debate on manifest disregard and the law of vacatur
goes to the heart of what arbitration is supposed to achieve in
contrast to litigation. Judicial review of arbitral awards arguably
creates a fundamental tension between the parties' choice of
settlement through arbitration and traditional reliance on the
courts to root out possible errors of law.48
Legally the debate centers on the tension between the
FAA-a congressionally mandated framework of arbitration that
discourages judicial review of arbitral awards-and a long history
of case law that encourages judicial review of awards. 49 As a
judicially-created doctrine, manifest disregard is arguably
inconsistent with section 10(a) of the FAA, which enumerates the
statutory grounds for vacatur but does not contemplate judicial
that, without a reasoned opinion, a party challenging the award must establish intent to
disregard the law by inference from the absence of any conceivable justification for it).
46. See, e.g., OneBeacon America Ins. Co. v. Turner, 204 F. App'x 383, 386 (5th Cir.
2006) (stating that, without a record, it was impossible to establish that the arbitrators
were aware of binding law on the issue); see also Noah Rubins, "Manifest Disregard of the
Law" and Vacatur of Arbitral Awards in the United States, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 363, 384
("A rule that allows extra-statutory vacatur only where arbitrators explicitly acknowledge
the proper law to be applied and proceed to ignore it simply encourages silence on the
part of the arbitrators.").
47. See Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 884 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that,
without clear precedential law, a court cannot find manifest disregard of the law).
48. See O'Mullan, supra note 9, at 1155 (discussing the conflict between arbitration
and the use of courts to review errors of law).
49. See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 45, at 119 (arguing that this tension between the
congressional scheme and the judge-made law must be resolved); see also ALAN SCOfT
RAU ET AL., ARBITRATION 134 (2d ed. 1996) (stating that there is a need to prevent a
"judicialization" of the arbitral process, but "public" supervision in the form ofjudicial
review may be necessary to protect wider social interests.); Katherine A. Helm, The
Expanding Scope ofJudicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Where Does the Buck Stop?, 61 DISP.
RESOL.J. 16, 17 (stating there is an unresolved tension between the limited grounds for
review in the FAA and common law grounds for review).
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review of the merits of arbitral awards. 50 On the other hand,
according to Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Professor of Law at St. John's
University School of Law, although much of arbitration law is
justified by looking at legislative intent, the key arbitration
statutes were enacted long before the growth of arbitration,
presumably making intent difficult to gauge.5'
1. Benefits of the Doctrine
The justification behind manifest disregard is that a party
should not have to live with an "egregious result on the merits in
an arbitration, especially one that results from deliberate failure
to apply law." 52 The doctrine of manifest disregard is meant to
allow a measure of review for egregious mistakes of law.
Although arbitration is created by contract, commentators
and judges raised a concern for contractual adhesion translating
into uneven playing fields that are best corrected by judicial
review.53  This is especially relevant because mandatory
arbitration clauses are becoming an increasingly important part
of commercial contracts in a variety of industries, such as
securities, employment, health care, and insurance, thus making
manifest disregard more important as a doctrine to protect
parties. 54  In this context, arbitration is not the result of a
50. See supra Part L.A (providing the language of the FAA); see also Hayford, supra
note 45, at 133 (arguing that manifest disregard of the law is in conflict with section
10(a) of the FAA and that section 10(a) does not permit the type ofjudicial scrutiny of
awards for which the current approach to manifest disregard calls).
51. Weiskopf, supra note 43, at 311 (stating that much of the law of arbitration is
based on speculative judicial perceptions of legislative intent but that the key arbitration
statutes were enacted long before the current arbitration boom).
52. Donald Francis Donovan, Current Developments in the United States, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM
PAPERS 2008 at 83, 93 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2009) (further stating that "at first glance,
the doctrine appears prudent and reasonable").
53. See, e.g., Weiskopf, supra note 43, at 290 (stating that judges are concerned
about contractual adhesion that translates to uneven playing field, and that courts and
juries are the best equalizers); see also Marcus Mungioli, Note, The Manifest Disregard of
the Law Standard: A Vehicle for Modernization of the Federal Arbitration Act, 31 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 1079, 1111 (2000) (stating that manifest disregard can protect individuals who find
themselves in mandatory arbitration).
54. See, e.g., Mungioli, supra note 53, at 1110-11 (stating that, at an ever increasing
rate, mandatory arbitration clauses are "slipping into" commercial contracts in variety of
fields); see also Developments in the Law-Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1170
(stating that mandatory arbitration agreements have proliferated in consumer contracts
and become more common in a wide range of fields).
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negotiated contract and instead it can impose a disadvantage on
a less sophisticated party. 55 Parties forced into arbitration lose
their right to trial, a negative impact that would be exacerbated
by a further limitation on judicial review.56 For individuals in
mandatory arbitration, the manifest disregard doctrine protects
them from what could possibly be an unfair forum unconcerned
with legal principles. 57
Weiskopf suggests that there could be different review
standards for different types of cases-a more liberal standard of
judicial review for cases involving public statutory rights such as
those provided by Title VII where there is more risk of
contractual adhesion (as opposed to business claims). 58 While
these arbitrations are not likely to be the subject of international
arbitrations, all arbitrations are governed by the same law of
vacatur in the United States.
2. Critiques of the Doctrine
There is much criticism of manifest disregard, both of its
existence as a doctrine and of its applicability as a legal standard.
Commentators argue that this judicial approach is not authorized
by section 10(a) of the FAA and is inconsistent with the public
policy underlying the FAA. 59 They describe these attempts as a
usurpation by the courts of the decisional authority delegated to
55. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Access to Courts, supra note 54, at 1175 (stating
that procedural deviations from civil litigation and the minimal role ofjudicial oversight
of arbitration disadvantage the less sophisticated); see also Mungioli, supra note 53, at
1111 (" [1I] ndividuals who find themselves in the throws of mandatory arbitration without
the protection of the manifest disregard standard are vulnerable to a 'capricious forum
that, at its worst is barely governed by the rule of law."' (quoting Daniel Blonsky, The
1 1th Circuit Puts a Major New Dent in the Armor Surrounding Arbitration Awards, 72 Fla. B.J.,
Apr. 1998, at 74, 74)).
56. See, e.g., Mungioli, supra note 53, at 1111 (identifying loss of due process to the
parties as a problem in mandatory arbitration).
57. See id. (stating that manifest disregard would help individuals in mandatory
arbitration).
58. Weiskopf, supra note 43, at 305 (proposing the removal of some of the
limitations on the standard but limiting the application to cases implicating public
statutory rights).
59. See, e.g., Hayford and Kerrigan, supra note 8, at 83 (stating that judges' efforts
to expand the review of the merits of an arbitral award is inconsistent with the FAA); see
also Galbraith, supra note 43, at 259 (stating that the policies underlying the FAA are not
served by expanding on the Act's grounds for vacatur).
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commercial arbitrators by the parties .... "60 Arbitration is not
meant to be litigation, and when parties agree to arbitrate, they
inevitably gain the benefits of arbitration but sacrifice some of
the benefits of litigation, including a full appellate process. 61
The extrastatutory grounds for vacatur are seen by some as a
serious obstacle to the institutionalization and acceptance of
commercial arbitration as an alternative to litigation.62 The
manifest disregard doctrine, along with all the non-FAA grounds
for vacatur, arguably erodes two of the defining features of
arbitration as compared to litigation: finality and efficiency.
Finality and efficiency are eroded because non-FAA grounds for
vacatur give a losing party disappointed with an arbitral award
means to challenge the award in court.63  Because judges
perceive their role in reviewing arbitral awards as important, they
are unlikely to limit their ability to overturn awards that they
perceive to be grossly wrong.64
A potential problem caused by the existence of the doctrine
is the "poor loser syndrome"-parties dissatisfied with arbitration
may appeal weak or even meritless claims on the assumption that
they have nothing to lose.65 These parties could potentially even
win their appeals since the legal standard is not applied by courts
60. Hayford and Kerrigan, supra note 8, at 83.
61. See, e.g., RAU ET AL., supra note 50, at 134 (stating that, in order to realize the
benefits of arbitration-expert decision making with reduced cost and time-litigation
challenging the process or the award must be kept to a minimum); see also Galbraith,
supra note 43, at 262 (arguing that agreeing to arbitrate brings both costs and benefits
and that arbitration is not the same as litigation).
62. See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 45, at 118 (stating that the extrastatutory grounds
for vacatur such as manifest disregard are a "significant impediment to the maturation
and institutionalization of commercial arbitration as an effective alternative to
traditional litigation").
63. See, e.g., id. (stating that extrastatutory grounds for vacatur rob the process of its
most essential feature of finality).
64. See, e.g., Weiskopf, supra note 43, at 290 (stating thatjudges perceive themselves
having ultimate responsibility to ensure that arbitral power complies to standards, and as
caretakers of arbitration); see also Hayford and Kerrigan, supra note 8, at 83 (stating that
many judges on the federal judiciary are unwilling to foreclose all possibility of
overturning arbitral awards that they think are grossly in error).
65. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 2, at 443 (explaining the "poor loser" problem);
see also Galbraith, supra note 43, at 262 (stating that, because parties do not know what
will justify vacatur, many motions to vacate that should not be brought are heard by the
courts).
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consistently.66 Thus, the manifest disregard doctrine inevitably
takes away from the finality of arbitration, which is supposed to
be one of the reasons arbitration is apart from litigation.67
Extrastatutory grounds for vacatur, such as manifest
disregard, also take away from the efficiency and cost-
effectiveness that is meant to be an advantage of arbitration. 68 In
addition, they indirectly discourage arbitrators from issuing
reasoned awards and instead encourage arbitral decision making
with less transparency. This happens because, in the absence of
reasoned awards that reveal how the arbitrator reached her
decision, courts are unable to evaluate whether the arbitrator has
manifestly disregarded the law.69 Noah Rubins has pointed out
that where a standard of vacatur is based on the arbitrator
acknowledging the proper law to be applied and then ignores it,
66. See, e.g., Nicholas Weiskopf, supra note 43, at 287 (stating that the unclear
standard has done little to predict which awards are ripe for vacatur, resulting in a
"roulette-like waste of judicial and party resources."); see also Kennedy, supra note 2, at
443 (stating that the poorly articulated standard encourages losing parties to seek
judicial review and may allow them to win).
67. See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 52, at 93 (stating that the doctrine "launches a
thousand petitions to vacate, even though those petitions rarely lead to the vacatur of an
award" and giving the example of an arbitral award that can be litigated through the
federal court system so that a choice to arbitrate "risks at least three, or even four, levels
of merits decisionmaking"); see also Galbraith, supra note 43, at 259 (stating that the
virtues of arbitration quickly disappear when the disappointed party is able to resort to
judicial review).
68. See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 45, at 118 (stating that extrastatutory grounds for
vacatur "increase the expense, time to resolution and consternation associated with
commercial arbitration"); see also Hans Smit, Manifest Disregard of the Law in the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 111, 122 (2004)
(stating that "[b]y this process, the very foundations of the institution of arbitration are
eaten away"); Kevin A. Sullivan, Note, The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial Review
of Arbitral Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 509, 554 (2002)
(describing the danger that expanded judicial review of arbitration will make arbitration
just another rung in the ladder of federal court adjudication).
69. See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 45, at 118-19 (stating that the extrastatutory
grounds for vacatur are an "overwhelming disincentive" to reasoned awards that reveal
how the arbitrator decided the questions of fact and law because such awards would
"facilitate judicial review of ... challenged arbitral results," leaving arbitral decision
making "off the record" and causing some to question the reliability of arbitration as an
alternative to litigation); see also Noah Rubins, "Manifest Disregard of the Law" and Vacatur
of Arbitral Awards in the United States, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 363, 384 (2001) ("A rule
that allows extra-statutory vacatur only where arbitrators explicitly acknowledge the
proper law to be applied and proceed to ignore it simply encourages silence on the part
of the arbitrators."); supra note 46 and accompanying text (describing how courts
cannot find manifest disregard unless there is a record or award that shows the
arbitrator's reasoning).
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the vactur of an award could turn on whether the arbitrator is
"stupid, or could feign to be so." 70
Courts have not vacated many awards under manifest
disregard. 7' As the manifest disregard doctrine can only succeed
under very narrow circumstances and rarely prevails, 72 it arguably
does not undermine arbitral awards. Donald Francis Donovan
argues, however, that even if the standard is articulated
deferentially, it remains a merits review of the underlying award
and it is thereby a tool for any unhappy party wanting to attack
an award.73 Stephen L. Hayford, Professor of Business Law in the
Kelley School of Business at Indiana University-Bloomington,
and his coauthor Scott B. Kerrigan, assert, for example, that the
manifest disregard standard is defensible only if it is applied in a
way that effectively insulates the merits of the arbitral award from
judicial review.74 The limited standard for manifest disregard
could potentially limit much of the litigation concerning what
grounds are sufficient to vacate an award.75
Given this debate on the legal standard and also the utility
of the manifest disregard doctrine itself, an important policy
question is: should manifest disregard exist and, if so, how can it
be reconciled with the statutory framework of the FAA? Part II.C
70. Rubins, supra note 46, at 384. Rubins is an attorney atJones Day LLP.
71. See, e.g., Weiskopf, supra note 43, at 287 (stating that manifest disregard has
actually rarely been applied to reject an award on its merits); see also Galbraith, supra
note 43, at 252 (stating that, although manifest disregard is often discussed, no securities
cases in which vacatur was based on manifest disregard were clearly upheld on appeal).
72. See, e.g., Tuck, supra note 9, at 577 (stating that, although manifest disregard is
perhaps the most often argued grounds for vacatur, the argument rarely prevails
because under the legal standard mere errors of law or mistakes of facts are not grounds
for vacatur).
73. See Donovan, supra note 52, at 93 (stating that manifest disregard allows parties
to attack an award, even if the standard is very deferential to the arbitrator). Donovan is
partner at Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP.
74. See, e.g., Hayford and Kerrigan, supra note 8, at 80 (arguing that manifest
disregard is acceptable only if when applied the merits of the award are not subject to
'judicial interference").
75. See, e.g., Galbraith, supra note 43, at 263 (stating that a narrowly and clearly
defined standard by the Supreme Court would eliminate much of "needless litigation,"
but that the best solution would be for the Supreme Court to find the FAA grounds
exclusive); see also Adam Milam, Comment, A House Built on Sand: Vacating Arbitration
Awards for Manifest Disregard of the Law, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 705, 731 (1999) (stating that
the inconsistent circuit standards for the doctrine hinders the efficiency of the
arbitration process because attorneys and courts are not clear on what is reviewable legal
error).
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of this Note presents potential solutions and Part III argues for
the doctrine to remain but to be harmonized with the FAA. In
the next Part, this Note discusses the Supreme Court's recent
Hall Street decision that has called the very existence of manifest
disregard into question and the recent case law developments
that have followed.
II. THE HALL STREET DECISIONAND SUBSEQUENT CIRCUIT
SPLIT
In Hall Street, the Supreme Court held that the FAA does not
permit parties to contractually expand the grounds for vacating
or modifying an arbitral award.76 In doing so, the Court raised
uncertainties about several issues under the FAA, including the
viability of manifest disregard as a ground for vacating arbitral
awards and the authority of parties to contractually reduce the
grounds for vacating arbitral awards. This Part examines the Hall
Street decision and then dissects the post-Hall Street circuit split
on the viability of manifest disregard. It also presents potential
solutions to the conflict between manifest disregard and the FAA
that could be instructive in resolving the issues raised by Hall
Street.
A. The Hall Street Decision
In Hall Street, the Supreme Court addressed whether the
parties to an arbitration agreement may expand the grounds for
vacating an award beyond those set forth in sections 10 and 11 of
the FAA.77 The Court held that parties could not expand vacatur
by agreement and agreed with the Ninth Circuit's approach in
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, which had
emphasized that sections 10 and 11 were the exclusive grounds
for challenging an arbitral award, even if the arbitration
agreement provided otherwise.78
76. See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1398, 1403 (2008). For a
detailed discussion of the opinion, see infra Part II.A.
77. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1400 ("The question here is whether statutory grounds
for prompt vacatur and modification may be supplemented by contract.").
78. Id. at 1404 (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., 341 F.3d
987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (describing
further the Kyocera opinion).
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In Hall Street, the Court decided between two conflicting
approaches to the FAA. In one approach, the FAA provides an
exclusive regime that reflects a policy emphasizing "finality and
efficiency" and limited judicial review.79 The second approach
emphasizes that parties should be free to agree to expand
judicial review by contract, and the FAA provides the procedure
by which a court can enforce the agreement because arbitration
is a "creature of contract." 80  The Court decided that the
language of section 9 of the FAA made it clear as a textual matter
that the grounds for review in sections 10 and 11 were exclusive;
therefore, the parties did not have authority to expand the bases
for review under the statute.8
In the case, Hall Street had argued for the second
approach-that Wilko v. Swan8 2 had created a extrastatutory
ground for vacatur through manifest disregard, and that parties
should be allowed to also contractually expand the grounds for
review. The Court rejected this argument, finding that there is
"nothing malleable about 'must grant' [in section 9 of the FAA,]
which unequivocally tells courts to grant confirmation in all
cases, except when one of the 'prescribed' exceptions applies."8 3
The Court stated that, in the context of whether parties could
expand the grounds for vacatur and modification, the statutory
bases for vacatur under the FAA are exclusive.8 4
While the Court did not extend manifest disregard in Wilko
to permit parties to contract for greater judicial review, it did not
expressly decide whether the doctrine remains an extrastatutory
79. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1403 (" [Sections] 10 and 11 respectively provide the
FAA's exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and modification ...."); see also supra
notes 25-31 and accompanying text (describing the FAA's limited judicial review of
awards).
80. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1404 ("Hall Street says that the agreement to review for
legal error ought to prevail simply because arbitration is a creature of contract, and the
FAA is 'motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements
into which parties ha[ve] entered.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985))).
81. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1404 ("To that particular question [of contractually
expanding for increased judicial review] we think the answer is yes, that the text compels
a reading of the §§ 10 and 11 categories as exclusive.").
82. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (describing how the dictum in
Wilko v. Swan is the legal justification for the existence of the manifest disregard
doctrine).
83. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1405.
84. Id. at 1400 ("We hold that the statutory grounds are exclusive.").
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basis for judicial review of arbitration decisions. The Court stated
several possible justifications for the manifest disregard of law
doctrine, including one that ties the doctrine back to the FAA:
Maybe the term 'manifest disregard' was meant to name a
new ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to the
§10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to them. Or, as
some courts have thought, 'manifest disregard' may have
been shorthand for §10(a) (3) or §10(a) (4), the subsections
authorizing vacatur when the arbitrators were 'guilty of
misconduct' or 'exceeded their powers.' 85
This language is not a definitive decision on the doctrine,
and only casts doubt on whether the manifest disregard of the
law is an appropriate basis forjudicial review.86 The Court stated:
In holding that §§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for
the review provided by the statute, we do not purport to say
that they exclude more searching review based on authority
outside the statute as well. The FAA is not the only way into
court for parties wanting review of arbitration awards: they
may contemplate enforcement under state statutory or
common law, for example, where judicial review of different
scope is arguable. But here we speak only to the scope of the
expeditious judicial review under §§ 9, 10, and 11, deciding
nothing about other possible avenues for judicial
enforcement of arbitration awards.87
This discussion in Hall Street on manifest disregard has
caused lower courts to struggle with whether the doctrine still
exists and what the legal standard is. 8 8 Commentators have
already stated that the Court may need to resolve this uncertainty
by taking up the issue again. 89
85. Id. at 1404.
86. Hans Smit, Hall Street Associates v. Mattel: A Critical Comment, 17 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 513, 519 (2008) (arguing that Hall Street has not actually decided whether manifest
disregard still exists outside of the FAA); see also Felsenfeld and Ruocco, supra note 17, at
24 (stating that the Supreme Court's opinion on whether manifest disregard could be
considered within the FAA is not clear).
87. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1406.
88. See infra Part II.B (describing the way lower courts have interpreted Hall Street).
89. See, e.g., Smit, supra note 86, at 519 (stating that the Court needs to resolve the
issue head-on instead of just speculating on it); see also Donovan, supra note 52, at 95
(stating that the Court "may have to decide the issue"); Felsenfeld & Ruocco, supra note
17, at 24 (stating that the confusion will exist until the circuit courts arrive at a
consistent conclusion or until the Supreme Court revisits the issue).
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B. What Does Hall Street Mean for Manifest Disregard?: The Circuit
Split
Circuit courts, as well as numerous district courts and state
courts across the country, have tried their hand at interpreting
Hall Street.90 This Note is limited to discussing Hall Street's impact
on circuit court decisions on manifest disregard. At the time of
writing, the circuit courts that have grappled with the issue of
manifest disregard by Hall Street are the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits. Additionally, the First Circuit stated in dicta in
one opinion that Hall Street abolished manifest disregard as a
ground for vacatur, but in a subsequent opinion vacated an
award based on manifest disregard standard without discussing
the impact of Hall Street.9' The remaining circuits have not
addressed the issue. The deepening split is between the
approaches of the Sixth, Second, and Ninth; and Fifth Circuits.
The Sixth, Second, and Ninth Circuits have continued to
review arbitral awards for manifest disregard of the law, although
they have adopted somewhat different approaches to the Hall
Street decision and the doctrine. The Sixth Circuit's
interpretation has left the doctrine untouched. The Second and
Ninth Circuits conclude that manifest disregard still exists, but
that it should be read into the FAA-effectively reaching the
result that manifest disregard is not an independent ground of
vacatur. The Fifth Circuit held that Hall Street had conclusively
rejected manifest disregard as an independent, extrastatutory
ground for disturbing an arbitral award, thereby compounding
the uncertainties produced by Hall Street and its interpretational
approach to the FAA. These opinions not only grapple with
whether the doctrine continues to exist, but with how to resolve
90. See, e.g., Robert Lewis Rosen Assocs. v. Webb, 566 F. Supp. 2d 228, 233
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing effect of Hall Street on the existence of extrastatutory
grounds for vacatur outside of the FAA's enumerated grounds); see also Prime
Therapeutics LLC v. Omnicare, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 993, 997 (D. Minn. 2008) (same);
DMA Int'l, Inc. v. Qwest Communications Int'l., No. 08-CV-00358-WDM-BNB, 2008 WL
4216261, at *3, *4 (D. Colo. Sep. 12, 2008); Chase Bank USA., N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d
342, 348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (same); Felsenfeld & Ruocco, supra note 17, at 24
(discussing some early post-Hall Street cases).
91. See Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008)
("[W]e decline to reach the question of whether Hall Street precludes a manifest
disregard inquiry in this setting. Whether or nor Hall Street applies, Ramos's claim
fails."). But see Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68, 74 (1st Cir. 2008) (no
mention of Hall Street).
2009] MANIFEST DISREGARD AFTER HALL STREET
the conflict between the doctrine and the FAA. Thus, the circuit
court approaches post-Hall Street also present possible solutions
to reconciling the exclusivity of the FAA and the existence of
extrastatutory vacatur.
1. The Sixth Circuit: Manifest Disregard Still Exists
The Sixth Circuit recently concluded in Coffee Beanery, Ltd.
v. WW, L.L.C. that it would follow its established precedent and
continue to vacate awards based on manifest disregard.92 By so
deciding, the Sixth Circuit left the doctrine untouched. The
court issued two opinions. The amended opinion discusses Hall
Street, finding that it did not clearly eliminate the manifest
disregard of the law doctrine. It states that "[i]n light of the
Supreme Court's hesitation to reject the manifest disregard
doctrine in all circumstances, we believe it would be imprudent
to cease employing such a universally recognized principle." 93
The Sixth Circuit's opinion thus leaves the doctrine untouched
and declares that the manifest disregard doctrine continues to
exist as it did before Hall Street.
In Coffee Beanery, the Sixth Circuit grapples with the issue of
whether the doctrine exists, but does not address Hall Street's
speculation that manifest disregard might be part of the FAA.
Subsequent to Coffee Beanery, the Sixth Circuit also referred to
the Hall Street discussion on manifest disregard in Grain v. Trinity
Health, but did not further interpret the Hall Street opinion.94
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit does not offer a clear solution to the
issue raised by the Supreme Court in Hall Street, but only
concludes that manifest disregard still exists. The Supreme
Court recently denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in Coffee
Beanery on the issue of whether manifest disregard survives Hall
Street.95
92. 300 F. App'x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) ("[T]his Court will follow its well-
established precedent and continue to employ the 'manifest disregard' standard.").
93. Id. at 419.
94. Grain v. Trinity Health, Mercy Health Services Inc., 551 F.3d 374, 379-80 (6th
Cir. 2008) ("To the extent that 'manifest disregard' is 'shorthand' for the grounds
enumerated in § 11, as the Supreme Court suggested might be the case for some of the
grounds listed in § 10... that does [the party] no good.").
95. See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 300 F. App'x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 2009 WL 1342336 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2009); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Coffee Beanery, supra note 19.
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2. The Second and Ninth Circuits-Manifest Disregard Survives
and Is Within the FAA
The Second and Ninth Circuits form the second approach
of the post-Hall Street circuit split. They have said that manifest
disregard survives but have reconceptualized the standard as part
of section 10(a) (4) of the FAA.
a. Second Circuit
In Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animal Feeds Int'l Corp, the Second
Circuit ruled that courts may continue to review arbitral awards
to determine whether an arbitrator manifestly disregarded the
law.96 Acknowledging that some courts have held that manifest
disregard did not survive the Hall Street decision, the Second
Circuit held that the manifest disregard standard continues to
exist as a ground for reviewing an arbitral award but that it
should be "reconceptualized as a judicial gloss on the specific
grounds for vacatur enumerated in section 10 of the FAA .... 97
The Second Circuit stated that it agreed with the Seventh
Circuit's view prior to Hall Street-
Like the Seventh Circuit, we view the 'manifest disregard'
doctrine, and the FAA itself, as a mechanism to enforce the
parties' agreements to arbitrate rather than as judicial review
of the arbitrators' decision.98
It went on to state:
We must therefore continue to bear the responsibility to
vacate arbitral awards in rare instances in which 'the
arbitrator knew of the relevant [legal] principle, appreciated
that this principle controlled the outcome of the disputed
96. 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2793 (2009) (concluding
that courts may continue to review arbitral awards to determine whether the arbitrator
manifestly disregarded the law). The case is currently before the Supreme Court on the
separate issue of whether imposing class arbitration on parties whose arbitration clauses
are silent on the issue is consistent with the FAA. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Stolt-
Neilsen, supra note 19; see also Stolt-Neilsen, 548 F.3d 85, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2793
(2009); supra note 19.
97. Stolt-Neilsen, 548 F.3d at 94.
98. Id. at 95.
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issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by
refusing to apply it.'99
By ruling this way, the Second Circuit, as did the Seventh
Circuit before Hall Street, read manifest disregard of the law as an
error in which the arbitrator exceeds his powers, within the
meaning of section 10(a) (4) of the FAA, rather than as an
independent ground for vacatur. 10 0 This reading places the
manifest disregard doctrine within the analysis of Hall Street. By
reading the doctrine into the statute, the Second Circuit ensures
that the doctrine survives. However, by saying that the doctrine
exists within the statute, it also, ironically, essentially eliminates
manifest disregard as an independent ground for vacatur. This
Second Circuit opinion explicitly overturned 0 1 a district court's
interpretation of Hall Street as having invalidated manifest
disregard of the law, making it clear that in its view the doctrine
still survives, albeit in another form within the FAA.102
b. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit has taken the same approach as the
Second Circuit on the viability of manifest disregard. It issued an
opinion stating that "in this circuit, an arbitrator's manifest
disregard of the law remains a valid ground for vacatur of an
arbitral award under § 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration
Act." 103  This holding was based upon the Ninth Circuit's
99. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co.,
304 F.3d 200, 217 (2d Cir. 2002).
100. Id. (stating that section 10(a) (4) of the FAA, which allows vacatur if arbitrators
"exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made," encompasses the
current manifest disregard standard because arbitrators "fail to interpret the contract at
all" if they manifestly disregard the law because parties do not agree to arbitrations that
are in manifest disregard of the law).
101. Id. at 94 (stating that the court does not agree with the courts that have
concluded the doctrine no longer exists, such as the court in Robert Lewis Rosen Associates
v. Webb, 566 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
102. In Robert Lewis Rosen, the district court had stated that:
[T]he Second Circuit's traditional understanding of Wilko and § 10-that Wilko
endorsed manifest disregard and that § 10's grounds are not exclusive-is
inconsistent with the basis for the holding in Hall Street, the Court finds that
the manifest disregard of the law standard is no longer good law.
Robert Lewis Rosen, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 233.
103. Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir.
2009).
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characterization of the manifest disregard doctrine as an
example of section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, which applies if an
arbitrator exceeds the arbitrator's authority.
This case was decided on remand from the Supreme
Court.10 4 The Ninth Circuit originally found that the arbitrator's
decision was in manifest disregard of the law, but on appeal, the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded it for reconsideration in
light of Hall Street.105 On remand, the Ninth Circuit found that
the circuit's view of the manifest disregard of the law ground for
vacatur is still permitted under Hall Street.106
The opinion reinforces the circuit's pre-Hall Street rule that
manifest disregard "is shorthand for a statutory ground under
the [FAA], specifically 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (4), which states that the
court many vacate 'where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers."'10 7  Thus, the Second and Ninth Circuits take the
position that manifest disregard exists, but only within the
framework of section 10(a) (4) of the FAA.
3. The Fifth Circuit: No Manifest Disregard Outside of the FAA
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon,0 8 a Fifth Circuit
decision, deepens the split among the circuit courts regarding
the interpretation of the Hall Street and the viability of manifest
disregard. The Fifth Circuit is the first circuit court to directly
interpret Hall Street. It found that "Hall Street unequivocally held
that the statutory grounds are the exclusive means for vacatur
under the FAA."' 1 9  The court decided that the manifest
disregard of law doctrine is no longer a valid basis for vacating an
104. See id. ("In a prior opinion, published at 514 F.3d 833, we determined that we
lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's order compelling arbitration .... The
Supreme Court vacated that opinion and remanded this case to us for reconsideration
in light of Hall Street ....
105. Id.
106. Id. ("We determine that Hall Street Associates does not undermine our prior
precedent, Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache T. Servs., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc).").
107. Id. at 1290 (citation omitted).
108. 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009).
109. Id. at 355.
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arbitral award under the FAA and held that sections 10 and 11 of
the FAA are the exclusive grounds for vacatur. 10
The Fifth Circuit rejected the established line of circuit
court decisions which recognized an extrastatutory basis for
vacating arbitral awards based on Wilko v. Swan.11' It also
explicitly overruled the Fifth Circuit's prior case law that
recognized manifest disregard of the law as an independent
ground for vacatur.112
The Fifth Circuit directly grappled with and interpreted the
Hall Street decision. 113 The court concluded that the Supreme
Court had reached its decision in Hall Street by looking at the
language of the FAA, which provides that an order "must" be
confirmed unless one of section 10 or 11 grounds applies."14 The
Fifth Circuit then concluded that only enumerated statutory
grounds can be used as grounds for challenging an arbitral award
brought under the FAA.1 5 The court interpreted Hall Street as
having rejected manifest disregard of the law as an independent
ground for challenging an arbitral award: "Hall Street rejected
manifest disregard as an independent ground for vacatur, and
stood by its clearly and repeatedly stated holding.., that §§ 10
and 11 provide the exclusive bases for vacatur and modification
of an arbitration award under the FAA." 116
In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit also discussed the other
circuits' decisions dealing with Hall Street. It characterized the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Coffee Beanery as having "narrowly
110. See id. ("[T]o the extent that manifest disregard of the law constitutes a
nonstatutory ground for vacatur, it is no longer a basis for vacating awards under the
FAA.").
111. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/AmExpress, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); see supra notes 34-36 and
accompanying text (explaining Wilko and surveying circuit court opinions that recognize
manifest disregard as an independent ground for vacatur).
112. Citigroup, 562 F.3d at 355 ("To the extent that our previous precedent holds
that non-statutory grounds may support the vacatur of an arbitral award, it is hereby
overruled.").
113. See id. at 351 (analyzing the language of Hall Street).
114. See id. (stating that the Supreme Court had said there is "nothing malleable
about 'must grant,' which unequivocally tells courts to grant confirmation in all cases,
except when one of the 'prescribed' exceptions applies" (quoting Hall Street, 128 S. Ct.
at 1405)).
115. Citigroup, 562 F.3d at 358 ("Thus from this point forward, arbitration awards
under the FAA may be vacated only for reasons provided in § 10.").
116. Id. at 353.
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construed the holding in Hall Street as applying only to
contractual expansions of the grounds for vacatur." 1 7 It also
made note of the Second and Ninth Circuit's reading of the
doctrine as part of section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, but did not
comment on or criticize the opinions." 8
The Fifth Circuit explicitly disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's
decision by finding that Hall Street held that section 10 grounds
are exclusive. 119 It did not, however, reject the Second and Ninth
Circuit's formulation of the standard as part of section 10(a) (4)
of the FAA. Although it seems that the Fifth Circuit has ruled
that manifest disregard no longer exists at all because it has
specifically said that the doctrine does not exist outside the FAA,
the Fifth Circuit's reading actually leaves room for manifest
disregard to exist within the FAA. If manifest disregard is not
extrastatutory, it could continue to exist under the Fifth Circuit's
approach. This approach would also be consistent with the
Second and Ninth Circuit's statutory approaches to manifest
disregard.
C. Other Approaches to Resolving Manifest Disregard's Conflict with
the FAA
Since Hall Street, the Fifth Circuit has advanced a clear
position that that the FAA provides exclusive grounds for
vacatur. 120 The Sixth Circuit has left the doctrine unchanged. 2'
The Second and Ninth Circuits have advanced the approach that
manifest disregard should be incorporated into section 10(a) (4)
of the FAA, which does not conflict with the Fifth Circuit. 22 In
addition to these approaches, scholars have also suggested other
ways of dealing with the conflict between the statutory framework
of the FAA and the manifest disregard doctrine.
117. Id. at 355 (construing the holding in Coffee Beaney).
118. Id. (summarizing the Second and Ninth Circuit's decisions on manifest
disregard).
119. Id. at 356 (" [W]e believe that Coffee Beanery misread Hall Street's discussion of
Wilko. We do not see hesitation by Hall Street to reject manifest disregard of the law as an
independent ground for vacating an award under the FAA.").
120. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Fifth Circuit approach).
121. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the Sixth Circuit opinion).
122. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Second and Ninth Circuit approaches).
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Scholarly opinion prior to Hall Street had suggested that
manifest disregard should be reconciled with the FAA. The
approaches can be broadly categorized as legislative or judicial
action.
1. Legislative Solutions
Some commentators have suggested that the U.S. Congress
should act to expand the FAA to incorporate the doctrine. 23
Weiskopf notes that much of the law of arbitration is based on
speculative judicial perceptions of legislative intent, but that the
key arbitration statutes were enacted long before the current
arbitration boom. 124 Perhaps legislative action would provide a
clearer picture of legislative intent and lead to a body of case law
under a single standard for manifest disregard of the law. 2 5
Christopher Drahozal, Professor of Law at University of
Kansas School of Law, argues that codifying manifest disregard
and giving it a clear standard would protect the integrity of the
judicial process. 2 6 He believes that this would enable courts to
avoid putting their power and authority behind arbitral awards
that "openly flaunt the law." 127  Rubins argues that the FAA
should be amended to either reinforce the effectiveness of
section 10(a)(4)'s "excess of powers" language, or by
incorporating manifest disregard of the law into the statute. 28
123. See, e.g., Milam, supra note 75, at 731 (arguing that Congress should
incorporate manifest disregard into the FAA and create a uniform standard); see also
Rubins, supra note 46, at 386 (arguing that the FAA should be amended to either
reinforce the effectiveness of section 10(a)(4)'s "excess of powers" language, or by
incorporating manifest disregard of the law into the statute); Mungioli, supra note 53 at
1117 (suggesting that the legislative branch should enact a narrowly tailored expansion
ofjudicial review within the FAA).
124. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (stating Weiskopf's view that much of
the law of arbitration is based on speculative judicial perceptions of legislative intent).
125. Milam, supra note 75, at 731 (arguing that incorporation would facilitate
"uniformity and predictability among the circuits, increase individual confidence in the
arbitration process, and encourage arbitrators to be accurate and fair in their
decision"); Rubins, supra note 46, at 386 (stating that the FAA needs to be reformed
because of the constant "evolution and devolution of judicially crafted grounds" and
that Congress is more likely than the Supreme Court to do so).
126. Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard, 8 NEV. L.J. 234, 250
(2007) (proposing that manifest disregard should be codified).
127. Id.
128. Rubins, supra note 46, at 386 (arguing that the FAA should be amended and
that, since the Supreme Court is unlikely to do so, Congress should).
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Some suggest that Congress should do more than just
harmonize manifest disregard with the FAA. For example,
Congress might require arbitrators to record the rationale for
their decision, or that, if arbitrators do not record a rationale, to
make sure that this does not impede a court's inference that the
arbitrators' decision was in manifest disregard of the law. 129 This
would presumably work against the disincentive for arbitrators to
create reasoned awards caused by the manifest disregard
standing being one of intentional disregard.1 30
2. Judicial Solutions
Commentators have also tried several ways of providing a
"statutory hook" for manifest disregard of the law in
contemplation of judicial action. The Supreme Court in Hall
Street also speculated that perhaps manifest disregard could be
located within sections 10(a) (3) or 10(a) (4) of the FAA.131 Some
commentators have tried to read manifest disregard of the law as
an application of the excess of authority ground in section
10(a)(4) of the FAA132 if arbitrators "exceed their powers."'133
This is the same approach advanced by the Second and Ninth
Circuits post-Hall Street. 34 They argue that, if there is no express
agreement between parties, the scope of the arbitrator's
authority is defined by implied arbitral powers.1 5 This approach
is based on the assumption that the parties did not agree to allow
the arbitrators manifestly to disregard the law, so that if the
arbitrators did so, they exceeded their authority.136
129. Milam, supra note 75, at 731 (suggesting that Congress further act to require
reasoned awards or ensure that the lack of a reasoned award does not impede
application of manifest disregard).
130. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing the incentive that the
intentional disregard standard creates for arbitrators to not issue reasoned awards).
131. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's
discussion of manifest disregard and the FAA in Hall Street).
132. FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (4) (2007).
133. Drahozal, supra note 126, at 239 (stating that some commentators treat
manifest disregard as an application of the excess authority ground in 10(a) (4) of the
FAA).
134. See id. (stating the position of those who read the doctrine into section
10(a) (4) of the FAA).
135. See id. (explaining the reasoning of those who read the doctrine into section
10(a) (4) of the FAA).
136. Id. at 239 (describing the viewpoint of IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAw (1994), §§ 40.1.3.2,40.5.2.4).
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Other commentators have argued that manifest disregard
could be contained within the meaning of section 10(a) (3) as a
form of arbitrator misconduct. 137 Hayford argues that manifest
disregard should be recognized as "emanating from section
10(a) (3) of the FAA," which covers arbitrator "misconduct and
misbehavior."'138 Hayford explains that a party seeking vacatur
under section 10(a)(3) of the FAA would have to prove
objectively that the arbitrator's refusal or failure to apply the
correct law is directly prejudicial to the arbitral award. 139 He
argues that, because judicial review of an alleged error of law
would not occur unless there is clear evidence that the arbitrator
correctly understood the law, this approach to manifest disregard
creates a positive barrier to judicial review of an arbitrator's
decision on the merits of a dispute. 40 An advantage of this
model is that it only requires minor adjustment of the case law in
circuits that recognize manifest disregard. 141
Hans Smit, Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, argues
that only disregard of mandatory law provides a basis for vacatur
under the doctrine because an award disregarding mandatory
laws may be regarded as violating public policy, and would
therefore be covered by existing statutory grounds for judicial
review.142 His logic is that such review would be based on the
mandatory nature of the relevant law disregarded rather than on
any of the grounds specified in section 10.143
137. See id. at 239 (describing the viewpoint of Stephen Hayford in his article Law
in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitral Awards, 30 GA. L. REV.
731, 816-17 (1996)).
138. Hayford, supra note 45, at 137 (arguing that a narrow definition of manifest
disregard, in which the arbitrator correctly interpreted the law and then ignored it,
describes arbitral behavior that would fit under arbitrator "misconduct" and
"misbehavior" in section 10(a) (3) of the FAA).
139. Id. (stating that the party must show with objective proof a nexus between the
arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law and the result of the arbitration).
140. Id. (stating that the misconduct/misbehavior approach within the FAA creates
a substantial barrier to judicial evaluation of the merits). The current approach to
manifest disregard also prevents a court from vacating an award because it disagrees with
an arbitrator's interpretation of the law or findings of fact, because it is focused on an
arbitrator's misapplication of clear law. Id. at 140.
141. Id. (stating that this model would require only a "sharpening" of the case law).
142. See Smit, supra note 86, at 519 (describing his view that only disregard of
mandatory law should be subject to vacatur under manifest disregard); see also Smit,
supra note 68, at 129 (describing his view on mandatory law and manifest disregard).
143. Smit, supra note 86, at 519 n.31 (describing the logic behind his argument).
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This Section has presented several potential judicial and
legislative solutions to harmonizing manifest disregard with the
FAA. Part III of this Note explores the future of the doctrine in
light of Hall Street, the circuit split, and policy considerations.
III. THE FUTURE OF THE MANIFEST DISREGARD DOCTRINE
This Note has discussed the developing circuit split on the
viability of the doctrine of manifest disregard of the law after the
Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street. It argues that Hall Street
should be interpreted as allowing manifest disregard to survive
and that the doctrine should continue to exist, but only within
the FAA's statutory framework. The status of the doctrine can be
resolved through two main approaches: (1) the Supreme Court
can resolve the circuit split and adopt the Second and Ninth
Circuits' viewpoints that manifest disregard exists within the
confines of the FAA, or (2) Congress can act to expand the
language of the FAA to include manifest disregard of the law.
The petition for a writ of certiorari in the Sixth Circuit's Coffee
Beanery case offered the Supreme Court an opportunity, which it
denied. The Court may revisit the issue if Circuit case law
continues unresolved and decide the lingering issue of whether
manifest disregard still survives after Hall Street and how it can be
reconciled with the FAA.
A. Interpreting Hall Street
The Supreme Court in Hall Street ruled that parties cannot
contractually alter the FAA's exclusive grounds for vacating or
modifying an arbitral award. 144 Hall Street did not, however,
expressly decide whether manifest disregard is a ground for
vacatur separate from the statutory grounds under the FAA, or a
way of summarizing multiple statutory grounds. 145
It seems inconsistent for the Supreme Court to rule that
parties cannot alter the exclusive grounds by contract, 146 but then
allow the lower courts to alter the exclusive grounds by creating
144. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text (describing Hall Street ruling).
145. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (further describing Hall Street
opinion).
146. See supra note 82-84 and accompanying text (describing decision to not allow
additional grounds for vacatur by contract).
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extrastatutory bases for vacating or modifying an award, and
extrastatutory manifest disregard. In Hall Street, the Court
rejected the argument that parties should be able to expand
sections 10 and 11 of the FAA because the Congress intended the
FAA to encourage the policy of enforcement of arbitration
agreements. 47 Instead of examining this policy argument, the
Court looked to the text of the FAA and found it to be at odds
with enforcing a contract to expand judicial review.148
Based on this interpretation that the Supreme Court gives to
the language of the FAA, it seems that, if manifest disregard of
the law doctrine is to survive, it must be found somewhere in the
FAA. The Supreme Court's statement that the grounds for
vacating an arbitral award stated in the FAA are the "exclusive"
grounds for vacating an award appears unambiguous and would
seem to exclude all judicially created grounds for vacating an
arbitral award. 49 It seems clear after Hall Street that arbitration
clauses providing additional grounds for vacatur are
unenforceable and that the doctrine must be contained in the
FAA. 50 This would ensure the survival of the doctrine, but
essentially eliminate it as an independent ground for vacatur.
The Hall Street Court stated the possible readings of manifest
disregard of the law doctrine and suggested that manifest
disregard perhaps may have been shorthand for section 10(a) (3)
or section 10(a) (4) of the FAA, the sections authorizing vacatur if
arbitrators are "guilty of misconduct" or "exceeded their
powers," respectively. 151 In this part of the opinion, the Court
cited the Ninth Circuit case, Kyocera, which emphasized that
sections 10 and 11 were the exclusive grounds for challenging an
arbitral award, even if the arbitration agreement provided for
147. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (describing Hall Street's
arguments and the Court's response).
148. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing the Court's examination
of the FAA's language).
149. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (describing Court's language on the
FAA ground as "exclusive").
150. See supra note 81-83 and accompanying text (describing decision to not allow
additional grounds for vacatur by contract).
151. See supra notes 84 and accompanying text (describing the Court's examination
of the FAA's language).
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expanded judicial review. 15 2 Perhaps this citation signals that the
Court also endorses Kyocera's interpretation of manifest
disregard. In Kyocera the Ninth Circuit stated that "it is clear that
the 'exceeded their powers' clause of § 10(a) (4) ... provides for
vacatur only when arbitrators purport to exercise powers that the
parties did not intend them to possess or otherwise display a
manifest disregard for the law."1 53 This supports a reading of the
manifest disregard into the FAA, the same approach taken by the
Second and Ninth Circuits, and consistent with the Fifth Circuit's
opinion. Kyocera would also especially support the Second and
Ninth Circuits' approach of reading the doctrine into section
10(a) (4).
B. Should Manifest Disregard Exist as a Doctrine?
The manifest disregard doctrine in theory can be a useful
tool to ensure that arbitrators do not act in a manner that is
clearly and fundamentally contrary to the law, which should be
beyond the powers of any arbitrator. 154 The doctrine is especially
important when mandatory arbitration clauses pull individuals
who are less sophisticated about commercial arbitration into
binding proceedings withoutjudicial review.155
Despite the theoretical benefits of manifest disregard, there
are many drawbacks to the current form of the doctrine. 156 The
FAA already provides statutory bases for vacatur of arbitral
152. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (describing Hall Street's reference to
Kyocera Corp v. Prudential T Servs.); see also Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade
Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2003). There, the court stated,
[The FAA] allows a federal court to correct a technical error, to strike all or a
portion of an award pertaining to an issue not at all subject to arbitration,
and to vacate an award that evidences affirmative misconduct in the arbitral
process or the final result or that is completely irrational or exhibits a
manifest disregard for the law.
Id.
153. 341 F.3d at 1002-03.
154. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (describing the doctrine as a
check on egregious arbitral errors).
155. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (describing the growth of
mandatory arbitrations and how such arbitration is no longer a negotiated contract, and
also how less-sophisticated parties suffer as a result).
156. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text (describing the critiques of the
doctrine).
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awards. 157 Manifest disregard exists in addition to these statutory
protections already within the FAA, thus calling into question the
utility of such an extrastatutory vacatur. Furthermore, the legal
standard for applying manifest disregard is far from uniform.158
Although not many awards are actually overturned under the
doctrine, the uncertainty of the legal standard makes it more
likely for a challenging party to appeal to the doctrine as a last
resort because they have nothing to lose. 159 The doctrine allows
losing parties another means by which to challenge an arbitral
award, which can lead to more time and money at the expense of
finality for the parties, and also an expenditure of judicial
resources. 160 If manifest disregard is clearly limited and the
standard is consistently articulated-either through clearer
language in the FAA or through Supreme Court interpretation-
the doctrine would gain its theoretical utility.
In addition, the doctrine potentially makes the United States
a less competitive forum for international arbitration, as it
subjects parties to an extra common law ground for vacatur
outside of the New York Convention. 161 Manifest disregard has
been held to be applicable to international parties when the
arbitration is in the United States. 62 This makes the United
States unique as an arbitration forum because it has an
enforcement exception subject to vacatur based on an additional
ground, causing enforcement to be relatively more costly than in
other forums. 163
The United States has a strong public policy of supporting
arbitration. 64 Arbitration is not intended to be litigation, so
157. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (listing the FAA grounds for
vacatur).
158. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (describing the various legal
standards for the doctrine).
159. See supra notes 65-66 (describing the "poor loser syndrome" where dissatisfied
parties may appeal weak or meritless claims).
160. See supra notes 67-68 (stating that manifest disregard can also take away from
the finality, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness of arbitration).
161. Id.
162. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (describing how U.S. courts have
ruled that manifest disregard is applicable to international parties).
163. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing how the existence of the
doctrine affects international parties' choice of the United States as a forum for
arbitration).
164. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (describing the U.S.
commitment to arbitration).
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judicial review should not be readily accessible to parties.1 65
However, parties should not be forced to tolerate a
fundamentally flawed award with no resort to judicial review,
especially in the case of mandatory arbitration. 166 Given the
benefits that the doctrine can provide to unsophisticated parties
in arbitrations, for arbitrations between parties in the United
States, the doctrine should exist to protect consumers and other
individuals who find themselves in mandatory arbitration. 167
In the context of arbitrations between sophisticated business
parties, which are most likely the parties in international
arbitrations, manifest disregard is not needed as an extrastatutory
judicial protection outside the FAA. Presumably the parties have
entered into a contract requiring arbitration after negotiations.
Such sophisticated parties do not need the additional protection
of manifest disregard and they would still have the means to
vacate the award under the FAA. In this context of lessened need
for manifest disregard in international arbitrations between
sophisticated parties, the uncertainty in the legal doctrine and
inconsistent application further detract from the doctrine's
utility.
C. How Should Manifest Disregard Be Reconciled with Hall Street and
the FAA?
After Hall Street, it seems that manifest disregard should be
incorporated into sections 10(a) (3) or 10(a) (4) of the FAA. This
can be done either by the Supreme Court or by Congress. Either
way, it should be done by using language that explicates what
manifest disregard means and sets a clear standard for the
doctrine's application.
165. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (stating that the benefits of
arbitration come at the price of some benefits of litigation).
166. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (describing the growth of
mandatory arbitrations and how arbitration in that case is no longer a negotiated
contract, and also how less sophisticated parties can be disadvantaged when they go to
arbitration).
167. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (describing the phenomenon of
mandatory arbitration and how manifest disregard helps less sophisticated parties).
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1. Action by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court should revisit this issue and resolve the
circuit split on whether manifest disregard can exist outside of
the FAA. It is best positioned to quickly resolve the issue created
by Hall Street. If the Court considers the issue, a helpful solution
would be for the Court to follow the FAA and the strong U.S.
public policies favoring arbitration by endorsing the analysis of
the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits-that the statutory grounds
in the FAA are the exclusive grounds for vacating arbitral awards
and that manifest disregard of the law does not exist as an
independent, extrastatutory basis for vacating arbitral awards. 168
The Sixth Circuit approach, which leaves the current doctrine
untouched, neither provides a solution to the issues surrounding
the doctrine, nor addresses the tension between the doctrine and
the FAA.
The Supreme Court recently denied the petition for a writ
of certiorari in the Sixth Circuit case Coffee Beanery, which had
presented an opportunity to resolve the issue left open by Hall
Street.1 69 If the circuit court split continues to deepen, the Court
may finally revisit manifest disregard. If so, it would also be
helpful for the Court to adopt an approach in which the manifest
disregard of the law doctrine can be read into the FAA. The
Second and Ninth Circuits' approaches to integrating manifest
disregard into the FAA post-Hall Street point to a relatively simple
and straightforward means for the Court to resolve the issue. 70
The Court could follow those circuits by ruling that an
arbitrator's disregard of the law can be a basis for vacating an
arbitral award under section 10(a)(4) of the FAA for excess of
the arbitrator's authority only if "the arbitrator is fully aware of
the controlling principle of law and yet does not apply it."
The Court could also choose to employ other statutory
hooks, such as reading the doctrine into section 10(a) (3) of the
FAA, which covers arbitrator misconduct and misbehavior. The
Hall Street Court already contemplated the possibility that
168. See supra Parts II.B.2 and II.B.3 for a discussion of the approaches of the
Second and Ninth Circuits, and Fifth Circuit, respectively.
169. See supra notes 19, 95, and accompanying text (describing the status of Coffee
Beaney).
170. See supra Parts II.B.2 for a discussion of the Second and Ninth Circuits'
approaches.
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manifest disregard could be read into either of these sections of
the FAA. 171 It seems that a straightforward solution would be for
the Court to adopt the approach already explicitly taken by the
Second and Ninth Circuits-to read the doctrine into the FAA.172
This approach can also be consistent with the Fifth Circuit's
holding that manifest disregard no longer exists outside of the
FAA because, by reading the doctrine as existing only within the
FAA, the doctrine no longer exists independently as an
extrastatutory ground for vacatur. 173 Thus the Court could also
adopt the explicit ruling of the Fifth Circuit that manifest
disregard no longer exists outside of the FAA and still use the
approaches of the Second and Ninth Circuits and read the
doctrine to be within the FAA. This would reconcile the post-
Hall Street circuit split and resolve the larger conflict between the
FAA and manifest disregard.
2. Action by Congress
Another approach would be for Congress to amend the FAA
to explicitly encompass the doctrine of manifest disregard. This
approach arguably would be more democratically legitimate as
an expression of U.S. public policy, as much of the current law of
arbitration is based on judicial perception of legislative intent.174
Congressional action could be an advantage because it is more
democratic and statutory enactments would be less vulnerable to
challenge. The FAA was passed in 1925, long before the
explosion in arbitration, so by acting on this issue, or more
generally to reform the FAA, congressional action would clarify
legislative intent. 175
171. See supra note 85, 153 and accompanying text (stating that Hall Street
considered the possibility that manifest disregard of the law could be read into section
10(a) (3) or 10(a)(4) of the FAA).
172. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the Second and Ninth Circuits'
approaches.
173. See supra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of Fifth Circuit approach.
174. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (stating that much of arbitration
law is based on judicial interpretations of legislative intent).
175. See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text (stating that congressional
intent is difficult to read since the relevant statutes on arbitration were passed decades
before the growth of modern arbitration and that clear congressional intent could
clarify the law).
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If the Supreme Court were to act on creating a uniform
standard, it could force consistent action by all the lower courts,
whereas congressional action would surely require more
litigation to flesh out a legal standard for the statutory language.
It arguably would be easier for the Supreme Court to act, and
more desirable because it can dispose of the issue more swiftly.
This would be an advantage because of the amount of arbitration
and persistent uncertainty in the area of the doctrine. It makes
sense for the Court to act to resolve an issue left open by Hall
Street-a Supreme Court decision-and to resolve the existing
circuit split.
Currently international arbitrations with the seat of
arbitration in the United States can be subject to manifest
disregard. 17 6 To increase consistency, the Supreme Court should
resolve the circuit split on whether the New York Convention or
FAA applies in petitions for vacatur by international parties. 177 If
manifest disregard were clearly read to be within the FAA by the
Supreme Court, or codified by Congress, international parties
would no longer be subject to vacatur on an additional
extrastatutory and potentially subjective ground. Further
consistency in the doctrine would be a positive development for
international arbitrations in the United States.
CONCLUSION
Hall Street has questioned the viability of the manifest
disregard doctrine and challenged lower courts to harmonize it
with the FAA. Whether manifest disregard is judicially read into
the FAA or legislatively amended into the FAA, the effect would
be to standardize the doctrine. The easiest and most likely
solution would be for the Supreme Court to resolve the
deepening circuit split on whether manifest disregard is viable
after Hall Street and then endorse an approach that reconciles the
doctrine with the FAA. This would add to the doctrine's' utility
as a form of judicial review and add to predictability and
consistency in enforcing awards in the United States, and further
176. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (stating that international
arbitrations can be subject to the U.S. manifest disregard doctrine).
177. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing the circuit split on
whether the FAA or the New York Convention applies to vacatur by international
parties).
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realize the benefits of arbitration. Furthermore, in the context of
international arbitration, the Supreme Court could also address
whether the New York Convention or FAA applies in petitions for
vacatur by international parties. Clarity on which law applies for
international parties in arbitrations would also further
institutionalize international arbitration, add to the predictability
of the process, and make the United States a more competitive
forum for future arbitrations.
